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NOTES
Criminal Procedure: Comparative Proportionality
Review of Death Sentences: Is It a Meaningful
Safeguard in Oklahoma?
On August 23, 1979, Leslie Gail Buford was repeatedly raped and sodomized
by four men. Her throat was then slashed and each of the assailants stabbed
her.' Although the four defendants were originally charged with first degree
murder, the punishments imposed upon those convicted were disparate. David
Owens was acquitted; 2 John Webster pled guilty to first degree manslaughter
and received a sentence of ten years' imprisonment; 3 David Blackwell was
sentenced to life imprisonment;' and Kirk Brogie was sentenced to die.' Pursuant to statutory mandate, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decided,
inter alia, whether Brogie's death sentence was comparatively proportionate
to the penalty imposed in similar cases. 6 More than thirty Oklahoma capital
punishment cases await the same type of automatic appellate review.7
The purpose of this note is to examine the capital punishment judicial review
technique called "comparative proportionality review" and its role in death
sentencing in Oklahoma. This will be done by discussing a recent United States
Supreme Court decision, Pulley v. Harris,Iand several Oklahoma death penalty
cases. This examination is timely because the Oklahoma legislature is, at this
writing, questioning the value of comparative proportionality review. A bill
1. Blackwell v. State, 663 P.2d 12, 14 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
2. State v. Owens, Norman Transcript, Mar. 31, 1980, at 1, col. 6 (Cleveland County Dist.
Ct. Mar. 31, 1980).
3. State v. Webster, Norman Transcript, Apr. 21, 1980, at 2, col. 6 (Cleveland County
Dist. Ct. Apr. 21, 1980).
4. Blackwell v. State, 663 P.2d 12, 14 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
5. See State v. Owens, Norman Transcript, Mar. 31, 1980, at 1, col. 5 (Cleveland County
Dist. Ct. Mar. 31, 1980).
6. Brogie v. State, 56 OKLA. B.J. 56, 62 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985).
The Court of Criminal Appeals chose not to use Brogie's codefendants' cases in its comparative analysis. The court stated that the two cases were distinguishable and thus unsuited
for comparative purposes because Brogie was the 'leader' on the night in question." Id. at
61. Brogie's death sentence was found not excessive after being compared to a host of cases
in which the defendants received the death penalty. Id. at 62.
Brogie was handed down the same day as Newbury v. State, 56 OKLA. B.J. 53 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1985), a factually similar case. The Brogie opinion, however, makes no reference to Newbury.
Newbury was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of a 15-year-old girl. The prosecutor
had asked that Newbury be given the death penalty. Like Brogie's victim, Newbury's victim
was raped and stabbed before her death. Why the Newbury case was not used in comparison
with Brogie is unclear. (The Newbury opinion makes no note of the fact that the prosecutor
sought the death penalty. The fact was uncovered in a review of the record.)
7. Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Records, as of Aug. 29, 1984.
8. 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1985

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

has been introduced into the Oklahoma House of Representatives that calls
for the termination of the review procedure. 9 Following an examination of
the status of comparative proportionality review in Oklahoma, recommendations for changes in Oklahoma appellate review procedure will be presented.
The Beginning
In Furman v. Georgia," the United States Supreme Court held that the

imposition of the death penalty under death-penalty statutes in three states
constituted cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth" and

fourteenth" amendments to the United States Constitution. The Court condemned the capital-sentencing statutes because the death penalty was being

meted out in such an arbitrary and capricious manner that any given sentence
was unconstitutional. The unconstitutional arbitrariness in sentencing was
generally attributed to the standardless discretion the statutes vested in juries
and trial judges. The majority opinions, however, revealed no unifying rationale for the Court's action.' 3 Thus, the exact requirements for a constitutional death-penalty statute remained unclear.
9. H.R. 1063, 40th Leg., 1st Sess., 1985. Presumably this proposed change in Oklahoma's
death statute is constitutional. Oklahoma's death penalty statute is modeled after Georgia's, and
comparative proportionality review is not constitutionally required under Georgia's statute. See
infra text accompanying notes 41-42.
10. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
11. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
12. The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No State shall . . . deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The five Justices who formed the Furman majority
and the four dissenting Justices filed separate opinions. The majority was composed of Justices
Douglas, Stewart, White, Brennan, and Marshall.
Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that capital punishment is in all cases prohibited
by the eighth amendment. Justice Brennan took the position that the death penalty is degrading
to human dignity and thus does not comport with the eighth amendment. Id. at 291 (Brennan,
J., concurring). Justice Marshall reasoned that capital punishment is per se unconstitutional because
it is excessive, serves no legitimate purpose, and is abhorrent to currently existing moral values.
Id. at 332-34, 359-60 (Marshall, J., concurring).
The three remaining members of the majority were not convinced that the death penalty is
completely prohibited by the eighth amendment. Rather, they viewed the imposition of the death
penalty as impermissible under statutes granting juries unfettered discretion. Each Justice, however,
focused upon different concerns to reach his conclusion. For example, Justice Douglas believed
that the statutes under review were unconstitutional because they operated in a manner that
discriminated between defendants. He observed: "They are pregnant with discrimination and
discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that
is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual punishment."' Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Stewart found the infliction of the death penalty intolerable under procedures that
permitted the penalty to be wantonly and freakishly imposed. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice White challenged the capital sentencing statutes because the death penalty was infrequently imposed and provided no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which
the penalty was imposed from the many cases in which it was not. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
See also Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth & Kyle, Identifying Comparative Excessive Sentences
of Death: A QuantitativeApproach, 33 STA. L. REv. 1, 9-11 (1980) (discussing the Furman
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In the wake of Furman, nearly two-thirds of the states rushed to redraft
4
their laws in an effort to reduce jury discretion and avoid inconsistent results .
State legislatures across the nation hoped to comply with Furman'smandate.
The Supreme Court reviewed its first post-Furman death-sentencing statutes
in 1976, declaring that the "guided-discretion sentencing" statutes 5 of
Georgia, 16 Florida,' 7 and Texas 8 passed constitutional muster. The Court rejected the capital-sentencing schemes of two states which made death the mandatory penalty for specific crimes.' 9 Within days of the decisions, the Oklahoma
legislature enacted a new death-penalty statute modeled after the Georgia
statutory scheme.2" Although the sentencing schemes of Georgia, Florida, and
Texas differed, language in various opinions indicated that mandatory appellate review of death sentences was a prominent factor in ensuring consistency and evenhandedness in capital sentencing. 2 Yet, the Court did not
answer the question of whether comparative proportionality review is demanded
by the Constitution. An answer came in Pulley v. Harris.22
In Harris, the United States Supreme Court addressed the specific issue
of "whether the Eighth Amendment... requires a state appellate court, before
it affirms a death sentence, to compare the sentence in the case with the
penalties imposed in similar cases if requested to do so by the prisoner." 23
The Court in Harris adopted the position that comparative proportionality
review by an appellate court is not required in every case in which the death
penalty is imposed and the defendant requests review. 24
The Harris Decision
"Proportionality" with respect to criminal punishment has been discussed

majority opinions). Because the three opinions conditionally suspended the death penalty, they
provide the foundation for the Supreme Court's later decisions which embrace the procedural
method to the constitutionality of the death penalty. See Weisberg, DeregulatingDeath, 1983
Sup. CT. REV. 305, 315 (1984).

14. Harris, 104 S.Ct. at 876.
15. With the use of statutory standards for imposing the death penalty, the sentencing

authority's discretion is guided so that the arbitrariness in sentencing that Furman condemned
is minimized.
16. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
17. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
18. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
19. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976).
20. Twenty-one days after Gregg was decided the Oklahoma legislature approved its current
capital-sentencing scheme. Act of July 23, 1976, ch. 1, § 1, 1976 Okla. Sess. Laws 627. See
Johnson v. State, 665 P.2d 815, 826 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (discussing Oklahoma's death-

sentencing scheme).
21. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206 (plurality); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258-59 (plurality); Jurek, 428
U.S. at 276 (plurality).
22. 104 S.Ct. 871 (1984).

23. Id.at 876.
24. Id.at 879. In Oklahoma, a defendant does not have to request comparative propor-
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by the United States Supreme Court in two different contexts. Traditionally,
proportionality referred to the abstract evaluation of the appropriateness of
a penalty for a particular crime: by assessing the gravity of the offense and
the severity of the punishment to determine whether the sanction is disproportionate to the crime and therefore cruel and unusual. 2 In contrast, the proportionality review discussed in Harrisis a review measure that "presumes
that the penalty is not disproportionate to the crime in the traditional sense." 26
The review procedure instead inquires whether a sentence is proportionate
to sentences imposed upon other defendants convicted of the same crime in
the same jurisdiction. 27 A death sentence has been called disproportionate or
comparatively excessive if other defendants under similar circumstances
generally receive sentences other than death for committing similar crimes.2"
In Harris,the Supreme Court used its 1976 decisions, 2' which upheld various
death-sentencing schemes, as a basis to determine whether comparative proportionality review is an indispensable element to a constitutional death penalty
scheme. As a result, a survey of these decisions is helpful in understanding
the Harris holding.
The decision most often relied on for appraising the individual components
of a statutory death-sentencing scheme is Gregg v. Georgia." In Gregg, the
Supreme Court concluded that Georgia's statute contained adequate safeguards
to satisfy the concerns of Furman.3 ' Comparative proportionality review is
a prominent element of the Georgia statute. Among other measures, 32 Georgia's
guided discretion statute requires that the Georgia Supreme Court conduct
an automatic review of all death sentences. On review, the state supreme court
is obliged to consider not only regular appellate issues, such as errors assigned
on appeal, but also whether the evidence supports the finding of an aggravated
circumstance, whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, and whether the sentence is disproportionate to that imposed in similar
tionality review. It is a mandatory review procedure in each case in which the death penalty
is imposed. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
25. Id. at 875. An example of this abstract proportionality evaluation is found in Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1977) (plurality) (death is grossly disproportionate penalty
for rape of an adult). See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (death disproportionate
penalty for accessory to robbery who did not attempt or intend to take life, and who was convicted solely under felony-murder doctrine).
26. Harris, 104 S.Ct. at 876.
27. Id.
28. Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, ComparativeReview of Death Sentences: An Empirical
Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J.CRW. L. & CRIMANOLOGY 661, 663 (1983) (noted in Baldus,
Pulaski, Woodworth & Kyle, supra note 13).
29. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
30. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
31. Id. at 198 (plurality).
32. In addition to the appellate review requirement, Georgia's guided discretionary statute
provided for the imposition of the death penalty in a small number of capital cases, bifurcated
trials, a requirement that one aggravating circumstance be present, and a provision allowing
consideration of mitigating evidence. Id. at 162-64 (plurality). See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2505
(1983); GA. CODE ANN.

§

27-2534.1 (1983); GA.
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cases. 33 The last review measure, comparative proportionality review, was
judged to be of significant value because it "substantially eliminates the
possibility
that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant
34

jury.

Georgia's death-sentencing statute was approved on the same day that the
Court sanctioned Florida's capital penalty statute in Proffitt v. Florida.3 5 In
Proffitt, the plurality opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens recognized that, unlike Georgia's statute, Florida's death-sentencing scheme did not
require that the state's highest court perform any express form of appellate
review, let alone comparative proportionality review. 3' Nonetheless, the

Supreme Court was satisfied that Florida's capital-sentencing statute was constitutionally sound. In approving the statute, the plurality observed that it
was the Florida Supreme Court's practice to review each death sentence to
ensure similar results are reached in similar cases. 3 The plurality reasoned
that "by following this procedure the Florida court [had] in effect adopted
the proportionality review mandated by the Georgia statute." ' 38
In contrast to Gregg and Proffitt, which both discussed the importance
39
of comparative proportionality review, the Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas
sanctioned a capital-sentencing scheme that made no mention of the proportionality review measure. Jurek was handed down by the Court on the same
day as Gregg and Proffitt. The Jurek Court's limited comment on Texas's
automatic appellate review of the jury's decision was that "Texas [had] provided a means to promote the evenhanded,
rational, and consistent imposi40
tion of the death sentence under law."1

It might appear from the emphasis given to comparative proportionality
review in Gregg and Proffitt that the review procedure might be constitutionally required. The Harris Court, however, clearly stated that its case law
did not establish proportionality review as a constitutional requirement. 4' The
Court explained that comparative proportionality review was merely an additional, but not constitutionally demanded, safeguard against
irrational sen42
tencing in the schemes examined in Gregg and Proffitt.
Consistent with this idea, the Court held that the California capital scheme
under which Robert Harris, the petitioner in Pulley v. Harris,was convicted
and sentenced to die passed constitutional muster without the proportionality
review measure.' 3 The Court found that California's sentencing system pro33. 428 U.S. at 167 (plurality). See GA. CODE AtN. § 27-2537 (1983).
34. 428 U.S. at 206.
35. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
36. Id. at 250-51 (plurality).
37. Id. at 258 (plurality).
38. Id. at 259 (plurality).
39. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
40. Id. at 276 (plurality).
41. Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 876.
42. Id.at 877.
43. Id. at 880. The majority pointed out that before a defendant receives the death penalty
under California's scheme, the jury must find that one or more special circumstances exist beyond
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vided for alternative checks that adequately protected defendants from the
systematic defects identified in Furman.44 The Supreme Court suggested,
however, that if a capital-sentencing system were deficient in safeguards that
sufficiently minimize the risk of arbitrary and capricious action, comparative
proportionality review could be constitutionally required.41
The HarrisDissent
The majority opinion in Harriswas met with a dissent by Justice Brennan."
The essence of the dissent is that the Constitution demands comparative proportionality review. To hold otherwise, Brennan suggested, is to
disregard the meaning of Furman. Brennan argued that the review procedure
is needed because it "serves to eliminate some, if only a small part, of the
irrationality that infects the current imposition of death sentences."41 7
Justice Brennan emphasized that the concerns surrounding the application
of the death penalty before Furman-irrational, arbitrary, and discriminate
sentencing-were real. These very concerns, Brennan noted, persuaded the
Court in Furman to question the manner in which the death penalty was then
administered."' As Justice Brennan recognized, the concern about arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty did not disappear with the Court's action
in Furman. Subsequent cases have reflected the Court's continued preoccupation with the subject." Likewise, Justice Brennan indicated that the Harris
Court never addressed the concerns identified in Furman because it simply
assumed the procedural safeguards provided by California's sentencing scheme
eliminate irrational sentencing. 0 Thus, Brennan suggested, the Harris decision sanctioned a death-sentencing system without earnestly questioning
whether the statute's procedural protections truly remove irrationality from
the sentencing procedure.
As Justice Brennan observed, the literature supporting the proposition that
the death penalty is irrationally applied continues to expand."' Scholarly
research, he stated, indicates the irrationality in sentencing is based not only
on race but also on factors such as gender, socioeconomic status, and even
geographic location within a state. 5 2 Thus, Brennan is convinced "similarly-

a reasonable doubt. The trial judge is then responsible for reviewing the jury's finding and stating

his reasons for not granting defendant's motion to modify the sentence to life. If the trial judge
denies the motion, there is an automatic appeal.
44. Id. at 880-81.
45. Id.
46. Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion. Id. at 884.
47. Id. at 888.
48. Id. at 886.
49. Id. See Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418, 3428 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct.
2733, 2742 (1983).
50. Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 888.
51. Id. at 887-88.
52. Id. at 888. It is the opinion of Oklahoma Deputy Appellate Public Defender Patti Palmer

that geographic location is a factor in Oklahoma capital sentencing. Ms. Palmer believes that
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situated defendants, charged and convicted for similar" capital crimes are
often given disparate sentences.5 3 Justice Brennan believes that comparative
proportionality review is therefore constitutionally mandated to facilitate
evenhanded sentencing. The "best evidence" of this, according to Brennan,
"can be gathered by examining the actual results obtained in those States
which now require such review.""' Brennan stated that Oklahoma is among
several states whose case law has demonstrated the value of comparative prodirected readers' attention to the Oklahoma
portionality review. He specifically
5
case of Munn v. State.
Comparative ProportionalityReview in Oklahoma
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals is required by statute to undertake an automatic appellate review of each death sentence, 6 and comparative
proportionality review is mandated. Oklahoma's statute provides that the Court
of Criminal Appeals must determine in each death penalty case: "Whether
the sentence is excessive or disproportionateto the penalty imposed in similar
cases consideringboth the crime and the defendant."'5 In addition, the court
is required to "include in its decision a reference to those similar cases which
it took into consideration.'"58 An examination of Munn v. State and other
Oklahoma capital cases raises the question whether comparative proportionality
review-as conducted by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals-is truly
a meaningful safeguard against arbitrary and irrational capital sentencing.
At the outset it is important to note that the most difficult and critical
step in undertaking a comparative proportionality review is selecting the group
of similar cases with which to compare the death sentence under review. The
key is to select a group of "cases which represent a sufficient cross section
'
of similar cases upon which an adequate comparative review can be made." 59
Unfortunately, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has not clearly
spoken on the issue of what characterizes a homicide case as "similar" to
one under review. The majority of Oklahoma capital penalty cases suggests
that the court considers comparative cases to be limited to homicide cases

a defendant who murders in rural Oklahoma is more likely to receive death as a punishment

than a defendant who commits a similar murder in urban metropolitan Oklahoma. Ms. Palmer
partly attributes this phenomenon to defense counsel in metropolitan areas being more experienced

in defending capital cases and thus more likely to plea bargain for a sentence other than death
for their clients. (Interview with Patti Palmer, Oklahoma Deputy Appellate Public Defender,
Nov., 1984).
53. Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 889.
54. Id. at 890.
55. Id. at 891 (citing Munn v. State, 658 P.2d 482 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983)).

56. 21

OKLA. STAT.

§ 701.13(a) (1981).

57. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.13(c) (1981) (emphasis added). Legislation in approximately twenty
other states calls for comparative proportionality review of a death sentence before it is affirmed.

For a list of these states, see Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, supra note 28, at 663 n.3.
58. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.13(e) (1981) (emphasis added).
59. Ross v. State, 233 Ga. 361, 211 S.E.2d 356, 359 (1974).
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in which a defendant has been charged and convicted of first degree murder

and given the death penalty.60 This, however, is not always the situation, as
Munn illustrates.
Munn v. State

Munn is of special interest because it is the only case in which a death
sentence has been vacated by the Court of Criminal Appeals because the
penalty was comparatively excessive. 6' Each judge filed a separate opinion
in Munn: Judge Cornish wrote to vacate the defendant's death penalty on
the basis of disproportionality;62 Judge Brett wrote to vacate the defendant's

60. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' current practice is to select similar cases from
the pool of appealed cases. This conclusion is based upon an examination of death-penalty cases
that have been handed down since the enactment of 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.13 to November, 1984.
See the following death-penalty cases that were affirmed on appeal: Stout v. State, 693 P.2d
617 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Nuckols v. State, 690 P.2d 463 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Robison
v. State, 677 P.2d 1080 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3524 (1984); Dutton v.
State, 674 P.2d 1134 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3548 (1984); Stafford v. State,
669 P.2d 285 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), vacated, 104 S. Ct. 2642 (1984); Coleman v. State, 668
P.2d 1126 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 986 (1984); Stafford v. State, 665
P.2d 1205 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), vacated, 104 S. Ct. 2651 (1984); Davis v. State, 665 P.2d
1186 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 203 (1983); Ake v. State, 663 P.2d I (Okla.
Crim. App. 1983), rev'd, 105 S.Ct. 1087 (1985); Parks v. State, 651 P.2d 686 (Okla. Crim. App.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983); Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251 (Okla. Crim. App.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983); Hays v. State, 617 P.2d 223 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980);
Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 269 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), vacated, Chancy v. Brown, 730 F.2d
1334 (10th Cir. 1984).
See the following death penalty cases that were modified on appeal: Eddings v. State, 616
P.2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), modified, 688 P.2d 342 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Morgan
v. State, No. 79-897 (Okla. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 1983); Glidewell v. State, 663 P.2d 738 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1983); Jones v. State, 660 P.2d 634 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Driskell v. State,
659 P.2d 343 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Boutwell v. State, 659 P.2d 322 (Okla. Crim. App.
1983); Munn v. State, 658 P.2d 482 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Johnson v. State, 665 P.2d 815
(Okla. Crim. App. 1982); Odum v. State, 651 P.2d 703 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), Burrows v.
State, 640 P.2d 533 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); Franks v.
State, 636 P.2d 361 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1026 (1982); Irvin v. State,
617 P.2d 588 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
See the following death penalty cases that were reversed on appeal: Tobler v. State, 688 P.2d
350 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Binsz v. State, 675 P.2d 448 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); White
v. State, 674 P.2d 31 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Coleman v. State, 670 P.2d 596 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1983); Hatch v. State, 662 P.2d 1377 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Smith v. State, 659 P.2d
330 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), rev'd, 55 OsKA. B.J. 371 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Hall v. State,
650 P.2d 893 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); Brewer v. State, 650 P.2d 54 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983); Cox v. State, 644 P.2d 1077 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); Giddens v. State, No. 78-164 (Okla. Crim. App. Nov. 17, 1981); Hager v. State, 612 P.2d 1369

(Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
61. This conclusion is based upon an examination of death-penalty cases decided from the
enactment of 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.13 to November 1984. See supra note 60 for a list of these
cases. The judgment to vacate defendant Munn's sentence was, in part, due to error at trial.
Munn, 658 P.2d at 489 (Brett, J., specially concurring).
62. Munn, 658 P.2d at 488 (Cornish, J.).
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sentence due to error at trial; 63 and Judge Bussey stated he was against vacating
the defendant's sentence."
The case involves a "sadistic murder." Munn knocked down his parents'
bedroom door and beat and stabbed his father forty times. He then eviscerated
his father's abdominal organs and heart. 65 Without citing a case to support
his claim, Munn argued that his sentence was disproportionate and excessive
as compared to similar cases. 6 As prescribed by statute, the court conducted
a comparative review of the sentence. The comparative proportionality analysis
in Judge Cornish's opinion 67 consisted of examining the sentence received by
defendants in other cases where (1) "an accused . .. killed a close family
member without provocation, ' 68 and (2) "a reasonable doubt as to [the defendant's] insanity [sic] at the time of the crime" was raised. 69 The opinion expressly noted that the Munn case was parallel to Hogue v. State,7 0 and that
because the jury recommended life imprisonment for Hogue, Munn should
also be sentenced to life imprisonment. 7 ' Hogue was one of ten cases that
formed the "universe" or group of similar cases used in the comparative
72
analysis.
These ten cases raise important methodological questions regarding the selection of similar cases. For example, scrutiny of the cases indicates that not
all the "similar" cases actually fit the pattern used to categorize them as similar.
In three cases, the opinions make no reference to the insanity of the
63. Id. at 489 (Brett, J., specially concurring).
64. Id. (Bussey, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 484.
66. Id. at 487. See infra note 123 and accompanying text, suggesting that attorneys be required to cite authority supporting their proportionality arguments.
67. Judge Cornish's opinion is the only opinion that referenced the similar cases used for
comparative proportionality review purposes as demanded by 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.13(e) (1981).
68. Munn, 658 P.2d at 487.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 498 (citing Hogue v. State, 652 P.2d 300 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982)).
71. Munn, 658 P.2d at 488.
72. Hogue v. State, 652 P.2d 300 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (charged with first degree murder
and convicted of same, sentence of life imprisonment); Burrows v. State, 640 P.2d 533 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983) (charged with first degree murder and
convicted of same, received death penalty; sentence modified to life imprisonment on appeal);
Naum v. State, 630 P.2d 785 (Okla. Crim. App), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1058 (1981) (charged
with second degree murder and convicted of first degree manslaughter, twenty years' imprisonment); Stedman v. State, 568 P.2d 350 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (charged with second degree
murder and convicted of same, ten years to life imprisonment); Cooper v. State, 524 P.2d 793
(Okla. Crim. App. 1974) (charged with two counts of murder and convicted of same, sentenced
to serve two consecutive life terms); Castleberry v. State, 522 P.2d 257 (Okla. Crim. App.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974) (charged with three counts of murder and convicted of same,
received three concurrent life sentences); Williams v. State, 513 P.2d 335 (Okla. Crim. App.
1973) (charged with murder and convicted of same, sentenced to life imprisonment); Grist v.
State, 510 P.2d 964 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (charged with murder and convicted of same,
sentenced to life imprisonment); Meadows v. State, 487 P.2d 359 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (charged
with murder and convicted of same, sentenced to life imprisonment); High v. State, 401 P.2d
189 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965) (charged with murder and convicted of first degree manslaughter,
thirty years' imprisonment).
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defendants, 73 and the facts of two cases suggest the murder involved
provocation. 7 ' Thus it is unclear whether the cases provided a real basis for
meaningful comparison. To complicate matters, Judge Brett's opinion ques-

tioned whether the criteria identified should have been the "sole criteria [sic]
chosen on which to base a comparison with other cases." ' 7 5 Presumably, Judge
Cornish considered that the two factors identified were suited for comparative
purposes because he perceived them as notable characteristics that probably
stood out in the sentencing authority's mind when assessing the defendant's
punishment. 76 However, Munn's universe includes pre-Furman cases, which
permitted unfettered discretion in sentencing. 77 It is therefore difficult, if not
impossible, to identify the factors that influenced the sentencing authority
in those decisions.
In contrast, Judge Brett determined that Munn's sentence was not excessive
or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. Brett rejected
the comparative criteria used in Judge Cornish's opinion. Instead, his approach to comparative proportionality review was to focus upon the "factors
enunciated in Godfrey [v. Georgia]."7 8 According to Brett, the notable
characteristics in Godfrey were that the victim died instantaneously, the defen-

dant immediately acknowledged responsibility for the crime, and the defendant did not "[reflect] a consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that
of any person guilty of murder." 7 9 "From an analysis of these factors, [Brett
could not] say the sentence of death was excessive or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases." 80 Judge Brett explained that Hogue's victim was instantaneously killed and that Hogue did not resist custody. In con73. See Castleberry v. State, 522 P.2d 257 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079
(1974); Williams v. State, 513 P.2d 335 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); Meadows v. State, 487 P.2d
359 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
74. See Williams v. State, 513 P.2d 335, 338 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (some evidence that
defendant shot his wife because she attempted to attack him with scissors); Meadows v. State,
487 P.2d 359, 360 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (defendant's father told defendant he was going
to get a butcher knife so that he could kill defendant, his mother, brother, and sister).
75. Munn, 658 P.2d at 488.
76. For an excellent discussion of what is called the "salient factors method" for identifying
similar cases, see Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, supra note 28, at 681-84: "Salient factors include those features of the case that seem most likely to have affected the jury's sentencing
decision." Id. at 681.
77. See Cooper v. State, 524 P.2d 793 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974); Castleberry v. State, 522
P.2d 257 (Okla. Crim. App), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974); Williams v. State, 513 P.2d
335 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); Grist v. State, 510 P.2d 964 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); Meadows
v. State, 487 P.2d 359 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); High v. State, 401 P.2d 189 (Okla. Crim. App.
1965). Using pre-Furman cases in a comparative examination is not unconstitutional. Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204-05 n.56 (1976).
78. Munn, 658 P.2d at 488-49 (citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 445 U.S. 420 (1980)). As explained
in the Munn opinion, the defendant's death sentence in Godfrey was reversed because the Georgia
Supreme Court had adopted such a broad and vague construction of the Georgia statute as to
violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Munn, 658
P.2d at 488.
79. Munn, 658 P.2d at 489.
80. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol38/iss2/7

1985]

NOTES

trast, Munn attempted to flee from the police and his victim was beaten and
stabbed before death. Brett stated that "the decision to impose the penalty
in one case, but not in another, may be justified by any factual circumstance
which relates to the offense itself or to the character or record of the
defendant."'"
Judge Brett's opinion implies that the cases upon which he primarily relied,
Godfrey and Hogue, are dissimilar to the case under review. Yet, because
comparative proportionality review is an inquiry into whether the defendant's
sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, it is critical that the cases used for comparative analysis be similar to
the defendant's. Judge Brett, however, compared Munn's death sentence with
distinguishable cases in which the defendant was not given the death penalty,
and then reasoned that therefore Munn's sentence was not excessive. This
analysis is unresponsive to the principal inquiry of comparative proportionality
review. After all, the group of similar cases is used to determine whether the
death penalty is "unusual for a specific set of circumstances""? and thus comparatively excessive. This determination is impossible if the cases are not
similar.
Another methodological question generated by Munn is whether the cases
used for comparative purposes should include cases in which the sentencing
authority was precluded from imposing the death penalty. This includes
homicide cases in which the jury returned a verdict of a lesser offense, such
as second degree murder or manslaughter, and cases in which the prosecutor
either did not seek the capital penalty or charged a crime other than first
degree murder. Munn clearly suggests the court has taken the position that
"similar" cases are not limited to first degree murder cases in which a bill
of particulars83 was filed and the sentencing authority chose to inflict the death
penalty. The universe used in Munn included cases in which the defendants
were either charged with and/or convicted of first degree manslaughter, second
degree murder, or first degree murder.8" The defendants' sentences ranged
from ten years' imprisonment to death.8 In fact, in only one case did a defenpenalty, and, on appeal, the penalty was modified to
dant receive the death
86
life imprisonment.
A more appropriate universe in Munn would have consisted only of cases
in which the defendants were convicted of first degree murder, including first
degree murder conviction cases in which a bill of particulars was filed and

81. Id. at 488.
82. Goodpaster, Judicial Review of Death Sentences, 74 J. CRim. L. & CRMhflNOLOGY, 786,
792 (1983).
83. A bill of particulars is a document that alleges the defendant should be punished by
death because of the aggravating circumstance(s) surrounding the murder. Okla. Unif. Jury
Instructions-CR 78 (1981).
84. See cases cited supra note 72.
85. See cases cited supra note 72.
86. See Burrows v. State, 640 P.2d 533 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1011 (1983).
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first degree murder conviction cases where the death penalty was not sought.
A universe predominantly composed of cases in which the defendants were
convicted of second degree murder or manslaughter is so slanted toward concluding a death sentence is excessively disproportionate that the universe is
unsuited for comparative analysis. Munn, however, is unique in this respect.
In nearly all other Oklahoma capital penalty cases in which comparative proportionality review has been discussed, the similar cases used as comparative
yardsticks7 consisted solely of cases in which the defendants received the death
penalty.
Other Capital Punishment Decisions
The Court of Criminal Appeals' typical treatment of comparative proportionality review consists of comparing a defendant's sentence to all state cases
in which the defendant was sentenced to death. Coleman v. State illustrates
this methodology.88 Coleman murdered a husband and wife who had stumbled
upon him while he was committing a burglary. The jury assessed his punishment at death, finding several statutory aggravating circumstances supporting
the sentence. It was determined that Coleman had previously been convicted
of a felony involving violence, had created a risk of death to more than one
person, had carried out the killings in a heinous fashion, had committed murder
to avoid arrest, and would in all likelihood commit future acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society. 9 No mitigating circumstances were disclosed in the court's opinion. The court's proportionality
survey consisted of comparing Coleman's sentence to all state cases in which
the defendant was sentenced to death.90 No rationale was articulated as to
why the cases were similar, other than that the penalty imposed upon each
defendant was alike. It is also unclear from the court's opinion whether the
aggravating circumstances found by the jury played any role in the court's
comparative analysis.
If a universe is made up only of cases in which the defendants' sentences
are death, the death penalty under review will naturally be found comparatively
proportionate. Comparative proportionality review can, therefore, be a meaningless check against excessive capital sentencing when a court simply compares one death sentence to another death sentence. To prevent this, a
87. See Robison v. State, 677 P.2d 1080, 1088 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Dutton v. State,
674 P.2d 1134, 1141-45 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3548 (1984); Stafford v.
State, 669 P.2d 285, 299-300 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), vacated, 104 S. Ct. 2652 (1984); Coleman
v. State, 668 P.2d 1126, 1138 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 986 (1984);
Stafford v. State, 665 P.2d 1205, 1218 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), vacated, 104 S. Ct. 986 (1984);
Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1, 11-12 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985); Parks
v. State, 651 P.2d 686, 696 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983); Jones
v. State, 648 P.2d 1251, 1260 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983);
Hays v. State, 617 P.2d 223, 232 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
88. 668 P.2d 1126 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 986 (1984).
89. 668 P.2d at 1138.
90. Id.
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thoughtful determination of what cases should be chosen for comparison to
the case under review is necessary. Nevertheless, it is unclear from the Court
of Criminal Appeals' opinions whether this determination is being made.
It is not unusual for the court to determine the appropriateness of the defendant's death sentence without mention of any particular facts and circumstances
of the case. This was done in Smith v. State.9' Smith, a 19-year-old, was
sentenced to death for the murder of a man who he and 16-year-old Ralph
Goforth had beaten into insensibility, dumped into a pickup, and set ablaze. 92
The jury found the death penalty to be warranted because the murder was
especially heinous. Although "the evidence against Goforth was as strong as
that against [Smith]" 93 and Goforth received a sentence of life imprisonment
for the same crime in another proceeding, the court nonetheless affirmed
Smith's capital sentence. According to the court, the three years' difference
in age was responsible for the disparity. 9'
The court's comparative study compared Smith's case to cases in which
the defendants received the death penalty as the result of a barroom shooting
spree,95 an unprovoked murder of a service station attendant, 96 a murder committed during a store robbery, 97 a kidnapping-murder for pay, 98 and a slaying
of a highway patrolman by a 16-year-old runaway.9 9 The opinion took no
notice of the dissimilarities or even the similarities in the aggravating circumstances, nor does it explain why these cases, which are factually
distinguishable, were used for comparative purposes.
Smith also illustrates the court's common practice of comparing a defendant's death sentence to capital punishment cases in which the sentence had
been modified to life or reversed on appeal.' 0 The propriety of this practice
is not explained and is arguably questionable. A comparative proportionality
review is logically an ineffective measure of appropriate sentencing when comparable cases include capital penalty cases reversed because of errors of law,
such as highly prejudicial conduct by the prosecutor and introduction of improper evidence at trial. These errors materially deprive a defendant of a fair
trial and, moreover, improperly and materially influence the defendant's
91. 659 P.2d 330 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), rev'd, 55 OKLA. B.J. 371 (Okla. Crim. App.
1984). The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded Smith with instructions to dismiss
the case because the defendant was prosecuted and found guilty of murder with malice aforethought.
The conviction could not stand in light of the Oklahoma Attorney General's admission that
it was not certain the defendant contemplated that life be taken; charging defendant with felonymurder would violate the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution.
92. Smith, 659 P.2d at 332.
93. Id.at 337.
94. Id.
95. Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
96. Parks v. State, 651 P.2d 686 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
97. Hays v. State, 617 P.2d 223 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
98. Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 269 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), vacated, Chaney v. Brown,
730 F.2d 1334 (10th Cir. 1984).
99. Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), modified,688 P.2d 342 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1984).
100. See Smith, 659 P.2d at 338.
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punishment. Absent the prejudicial error, the defendant might not have
received the death penalty.
Thus, employing these cases in a comparative study is fundamentally unfair to the defendant whose sentence is under review and is of limited value
in determining the extent to which juries throughout the state are willing to
impose the death penalty in appropriate cases. It is also unfair to use, as
comparative yardsticks, death-penalty cases that have been reversed due to
the use of defective verdict forms and trial court action amounting to a directed
verdict for the death penalty. Yet, it is not unusual for the Court of Criminal
Appeals to use in its proportionality review capital punishment cases that have
been modified and reversed for these very reasons.' Indeed, such was the
practice in Smith. 02
Consequently, a comparative proportionality review undertaken by the Court
of Criminal Appeals often consists of comparing the defendant's case with
all the state's post-Furman capital punishment cases. There is usually no
explanation why the cases are similar to the one under review. Moreover,
the universe typically encompasses cases that have been modified or reversed
on appeal.
For example, in Parks v. State," 3 the court discharged its proportionality
review responsibility by comparing the defendant's sentence with "all of the
death penalty cases decided" 0t' under Oklahoma's current death-penalty
statute. Of the seven capital punishment cases in the court's universe, three
of the defendants' sentences had been modified on appeal, 0 5 one case had
101. See, e.g., Nuckols v. State, 690 P.2d 463, 473 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Stout v. State,
55 OKLA. B.J. 2269, 2276 (Okla. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 1984); Robison v. State, 677 P.2d 1080,
1088 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Dutton v. State, 674 P.2d 1134, 1141 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984),
cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 3548 (1984); Stafford v. State, 669 P.2d 285, 299-300 (Okla. Crim. App.
1983), vacated, 104 S.Ct. 2652 (1984); Coleman v. State, 668 P.2d 1126, 1138 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 986 (1984); Stafford v. State, 665 P.2d 1204, 1218 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1983), vacated, 104 S. Ct. 2651 (1984); Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1, 11-12 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1983), rev'd, 105 S.Ct. 1087 (1985); Parks v. State, 651 P.2d 686, 696 (Okla. Crim. App.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983); Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251, 1260 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1982).
102. The death-penalty cases used for comparative purposes in Smith that had been reversed
or modified on appeal included: Hall v. State, 650 P.2d 893 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (reversed
and remanded for new trial because of Brady and Agurs violations); Brewer v. State, 650 P.2d
54 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (reversed and remanded for new trial because of prosecutorial misconduct); Franks v. State, 636 P.2d 361 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1026 (1982)
(charged under felony-murder doctrine; however, predicate felonies did not support conviction,
and the verdict forms used resulted in a directed verdict if any aggravating circumstances were
found; thus, death sentence modified); Irwin v. State, 617 P.2d 588 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980)
(modification of sentence warranted because of trial court action which amounted to directed
verdict for death penalty); Hagger v. State, 612 P.2d 1369 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (reversed
and remanded for new trial because of improper closing argument by prosecutor).
103. 651 P.2d 686 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
104. 651 P.2d at 696 n.3.
105. Burrows v. State, 640 P.2d 533 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011
(1983); Franks v. State, 636 P.2d 361 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981), cert. denied, 455-U.S. 1026
(1982); Irwin v. State, 617 P.2d 588 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
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been reversed,' 0 6 and three sentences had been affirmed.'1 7 The court failed
to reveal why the cases were similar to Parks', except that the defendant in
all the cases received the death penalty.
Parks murdered a service station attendant who he believed was going to
notify authorities that he had used a stolen credit card to purchase gasoline.
The "similar" cases used by the court involved a fatal car crash while the
defendant was escaping the scene of a crime, 0 8 a wife-killer with a history
devoid of violent behavior,' 9 a kidnapping-murder for extortion, 10 and an
unprovoked slaying of a highway patrolman by a juvenile."' In three cases,
the defendant committed murder during an armed robbery."'
It is of special interest to Oklahoma criminal defense lawyers faced with
arguing disproportionality of a capital sentence that one of the "similar" cases
used in Parksis unpublished." 3 Lawyers who do not regularly defend capitalpenalty defendants may be unaware that the disposition of a few death-penalty
cases has been by unpublished opinion. This method of disposition is unfortunate: it presents a risk that lawyers will overlook an unpublished deathpenalty case that may be of assistance in arguing that a sentence is
disproportionate.
Perhaps the most telling criticism of the court's comparative proportionality review stems from its review in Davis v. State."' In Davis, the Court
of Criminal Appeals discharged its review responsibility simply by stating that
it found the sentence of death not disproportionate to the penalty imposed
in other similar cases. The court's opinion reveals no comparative analysis
and cites no cases to support the finding.
As it is currently conducted by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals,
comparative proportionality review is of marginal value in identifying
disproportionality in capital sentencing between similarly situated defendants.
Munn represents the court's best effort at a meaningful comparative propor106. Giddens v. State, No. 78-164 (Okla. Crim. App. Nov. 17, 1981).
107. Hays v. State, 617 P.2d 223 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980); Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 269
(Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit recently granted Chaney new sentencing hearing because prosecution failed to divulge potentially exculpatory evidence, Chancy
v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1359 (10th Cir. 1984)); Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1980) (death sentence modified to life imprisonment at 688 P.2d 342 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984)).
108. See Franks v. State, 636 P.2d 361 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1026

(1982).
109. See Burrows v. State, 640 P.2d 533 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1011 (1983).

110. See Chancy v. State, 612 P.2d 269 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), vacated, Chaney v. Brown,
730 F.2d 1334 (10th Cir. 1984).
I11. See Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), modified, 688 P.2d 342
(Okla. Crim. App. 1984).
112. See Irwin v. State, 617 P.2d 588 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980); Giddens v. State, No. 78-164
(Okla. Crim. App. Nov. 17, 1981); Hays v. State, 617 P.2d 223 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
113. See Giddens v. State, No. 78-164 (Okla. Crim. App. Nov. 17, 1981). Other unpublished
capital-penalty cases include: Smith v. State, No. 78-331 (Okla. Crim. App. Feb. 6, 1984); Morgan
v. State, No. 79-487 (Okla. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 1983).
114. 665 P.2d 1186 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
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tionality review. Even there, the court failed to analyze whether Munn's
sentence was disproportionate or proportionate to the sentences imposed in
similar cases.
Comparative reviews of the sort undertaken in Munn are fraught with shortcomings that thwart the enlightened goals of comparative proportionality
review. In addition, it is uncertain whether the "similar" cases used in the
discharge of comparative proportionality review in other Oklahoma capital
punishment cases provided a real basis for thoughtful comparison. Under these
circumstances, it is difficult to view comparative proportionality review as
a meaningful safeguard to evenhanded capital sentencing in Oklahoma.
Recommendations
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals confronted what some legal commentators regard as a major issue in capital sentencing"' when it undertook
a comparative proportionality review of the death sentence in Brogie v. State."
The court was faced with deciding not only whether Brogie's codefendant,
Blackwell,"" who received life imprisonment, should be among the group of
similar cases used for comparative purposes, but also whether to consider
codefendant Webster's" 8 ten-year prison sentence, a product of a plea bargain.
Brogie is the perfect example of why comparative proportionality review is
vital to a death-sentencing scheme. If the codefendants are equally culpable
and there is no significant distinction among the three, a thoughtful comparative analysis should identify any disproportionality in sentencing.
Therefore, the following recommendations are made in an attempt to develop
comparative proportionality review into an effective tool for reducing
arbitrariness in death sentencing.
First, the Oklahoma legislature should adopt a measure like that found in
Georgia. To assist the Georgia Supreme Court in conducting a meaningful
death-sentence review, the court is statutorily authorized to employ appropriate
staff to compile data necessary to determine the validity of a sentence.' 19 Such
a measure in Oklahoma would probably enhance the availability of research
on similar cases. Thus, when selecting similar cases for comparative analysis,
the Court of Criminal Appeals would have the opportunity to give more informed consideration to the salient facts of the crime and aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.
The Report of the Trial Judge can assist the court in obtaining the data
needed to conduct a meaningful review. In each case in which the death penalty
is imposed, the trial judge is required to complete a Report of the Trial

115. See Goodpaster, supra note 82, at 811 n.144 ("Fairness in sentencing between capital
defendants who receive a capital sentence and those who plea bargain and receive a lesser sentence
is a major issue in capital sentencing law.").
116. 56 OKLA. B.J. 56 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985).
117. See supra text accompanying note 4.
118. See supra text accompanying note 3.
119. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537 (1981).
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Judge.'2 ° The report contains information concerning the defendant, the trial,
the offense, and the defendant's representation. For example, the report inquires into such things as the defendant's work history, the type of weapon
used in the crime, the intelligence level of the defendant, and the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances found by the sentencer.' 2 ' Court staff should
index and compile the data for systematic computer reference. In this way,
the information can be used as a means of determining whether cases are
similar.
Second, it is suggested that the group of similar cases used for comparison
should encompass similar first degree murder cases in which the defendant
received life imprisonment as punishment. Without the benefit of these cases,
the court will not have a complete picture of the usual sentencing practices
of Oklahoma juries. Clearly, if comparative proportionality review is to serve
as a check against disproportionality in death sentencing, similar "life" cases
must be in the comparative analysis.' 22 So that information concerning "life"
cases is readily available to the court, the Report of the Trial Judge should
be completed each time a defendant is convicted of first degree murder.
Third, because the court must undertake a comparative review of each death
sentence, Oklahoma criminal defense attorneys have the chance to assist the
court in selecting the similar cases that play a crucial role in the comparative
analysis. Right now it is unclear from the court's opinions whether attorneys
in capital-sentence cases realize that disproportionality of sentencing may be
a meritorious argument.'2 3 Therefore, to encourage and facilitate a meaningful
comparative proportionality review, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals should promulgate a court rule requiring attorneys to address the issue
of proportionality in their appellate briefs and to cite authority supporting
their arguments.
Fourth, to aid attorneys in the formation of a disproportionality sentencing argument, it would be beneficial for the court's capital-murder opinions
to state whether a bill of particulars was filed against a defendant who received life imprisonment as punishment. This fact would significantly contribute
to determining under what circumstances capital-murder defendants are
generally given life imprisonment rather than the death penalty.
As a further aid in the review process, opinions should make special note
of any mitigating circumstances because this may clearly distinguish apparently
factually similar cases from the case under review. Finally, to facilitate ready
access to capital-murder decisions, all capital-murder opinions should be
§ 701.13(a) (1981).
121. This author suggests that the Trial Judge's Report should also ask: (1) the length of
premeditation: was it greater than five minutes; (2) did the crime occur in a public place; (3)
did defendant commit crimes after the murder; (4) did the victim plead for his life prior to
being murdered; (5) did defendant have a history of drug or alcohol abuse; and (6) did defendant
consume drugs or alcohol prior to the murder?
122. See Goodpaster, supra note 82, at 816 (discussing the shortcomings of excluding cases
in which defendant has received life imprisonment from cases used for comparative proportionality
review purposes).
123. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
120. 21 OKuA. STAT.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1985

